Relative Performance-Messung als Instrument der Unternehmenssteuerung

Abstract

Stabilizing and improving organizational performance is a central challenge in management control. Behavior-based results controls is a key mechanism in this context. The lack of a generally effective and accepted incentive system requires a deeper examination of the underlying mechanisms beyond surface-level system features. Relative Performance Measurement (RPM) is considered a dynamic tool to align performance and motivation with strategic goals. However, its use is associated with risks such as demotivation and dysfunctional behavior. This study analyzes the effects of RPM in the context of competition and social comparison within the social system of the organization. Based on agency theory (AT), the economic rationale of RPM is derived using tournament theory. Its limitations are discussed using the example of forced-ranking practices. The perspective is extended by social comparison theory, which shows how task-related, individual, and contextual variables, as well as system design, influence the effectiveness of RPM in different settings. The study contributes to the integration of economic and behavioral approaches in performance measurement (PM) and provides practical implications for the targeted design of RPM systems in management control.

Keywords: tournament theory; social comparison theory; management control; agency theory; relative performance measurement